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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
The Utah Court of Appeals has jurisdiction over this matter pursuant to Utah Code 
Ann. §78-2a-3(2)G). 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
L Did the trial court abuse Its discretion by granting defendants' motion to 
dismiss for failure to prosecute when the defendants had asserted a counterclaim and 
when? !:u!a >a:"t;e>had iaik-: .<, ;;ro>v;-i]n; ;U:;/ si:i-i/\:> />>r at;:-j;r-: -.inM'tv; -. MU: -.a/ 
period? 
Standard of Appellate Review 
In determining whether the trial court properly granted a motion to dismiss for 
failure to prosecute, the appellate court will review the decision under an ahi ise of 
discretion standard. Hartford Lease Corp. v. State, 838 P.2d 694 (Ut. Ct. App. 1994). 
Issues Preserved in Trial Court 
This issue was preserved in the trial court at R. 1761-1780. 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS AND STATUTES INVOLVED 
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure 41(b): 
For failure of the plaintiff to prosecute or to comply with these rules or any order of court, 
a defendant may move for dismissal of an action or of any claim against him. After the 
1 
plaintiff, in an action tried by the court without a jury, has completed the presentation of 
his evidence the defendant without warving his right to offer evidence in the event the 
motion is not granted, may move for a dismissal on the ground that upon the facts and the 
law the plaintiff has shown no right to relief. The court as trier of the facts may then 
determine them and render judgment against the plaintiff or may decline to render any 
judgment until the close of all the evidence. If the court renders judgment on the merits 
against the plaintiff, the court shall make findings as provided in Rule 52(a). Unless the 
court in its order for dismissal otherwise specifies, a dismissal under this subdivision and 
any dismissal not provided for in this rule, other than a dismissal for lack of jurisdiction 
or for improper venue or for lack of an indispensable party, operates as an adjudication 
upon the merits. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case 
This matter comes before this Court pursuant to Janet Peterson's (hereinafter 
referred to as "Peterson") appeal of the Order signed by the Honorable Claudia Laycock, 
Fourth Judicial District Court Judge, on January 6.2004. and entered on January 7,2004. 
This case arises out of a claim by Peterson against Sunrider Corporation, d.b.a. 
Sunrider International (hereinafter collectively referred to as "Sunrider"), for breach of 
contract and the covenants of good faith and fair dealing, and against Tei Fu Chen 
(hereinafter referred to as "Chen"), the Chairman of Sunrider s Board of Directors, for 
tortious interference with contract. 
Course of Proceedings and Disposition Below 
Peterson filed a Complaint -n :hj !\ ur;h ':i-ivxi Conn of Utah, in and for Utah 
County on March 19, 1996. (R. 1-9). Sunrider and Chen tiled their Answer on May 3, 
1996. (R. 13-19). Peterson subsequently filed an Amended Complaint on September 11, 
1996. (R. 42-53). Sunrider and Chen filed an Answer To Amended Complaint And 
Counterclaim on October 8, 1996. t / . -o3>, ami Peterson filed an Answer To 
Counterclaim on October 9, 1996. (R. 64-66). 
After successfully appealing to the Utah Supreme Court the dismissal of Peterson's 
claim, this matter was remanded to the Fourth District Court on May 16. 2002. for further 
proceedings. (R. 1730-1750). On August 29. 2003, Sunrider and Chen fled a Motion to 
Dismiss for Failure to Prosecute with accompanying Memorandum in Support of Motion 
to Dismiss for Failure to Prosecute. (R. 1755-1760). On September 16. 2003, Peterson 
filed a Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Opposition to the Motion to Dismiss for 
Failure to Prosecute (R. 1761-1780). Sunrider and Chen tiled a Reply to Plaintiffs 
Memorandum in Opposition to Motion to Dismiss for Failure to Prosecute on September 
29.2003. (R. 1781-1784). 
On November 26, 2003, a Ruling on Defendants' Motion to Dismiss for Failure to 
Prosecute was tiled. (R. 1788-1795). The Order of Dismissal With Prejudice was entered 
on January 7. 2004. (R. 1801-1802). 
Statement of Facts 
1. After filing an initial Complaint. Peterson filed an Amended Complaint on 
September 11,1996, to which Sunrider and Chen filed an Answer To Amended Complaint 
And Counterclaim on October 8, 1996. (R. 42-63). 
2. Sunrider"s and Chen's Counterclaim stated that Ma case and controversy exists 
between the parties regarding their respective rights and duties" and sought a judicial 
determination of the force, scope and effect any agreements which may govern the 
relationship between the parties. (R. 55-56). 
3. On May 18, 1998, the Honorable Howard H. Maetani held consolidated oral 
arguments on Peterson's motion for partial summary judgment and Sunrider's and Chen's 
motions to dismiss and for summary judgment, as well as other non-dispositive motions 
filed by both Peterson and Sunrider and Chen. (R. 14^2). 
4. On June 15,1998, Judge Maetani issued a Memorandum Decision granting 
Sunrider's and Chen's motions to dismiss and for summary judgment, and denying 
Peterson's motion for partial summary judgment (R. 1575-85). 
5. On October 6, 1998, Judge Maetani signed and entered an Order memorializing 
his ruling in the June 15, 1998 Memorandum Decision. (R. 1613-16). 
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o. On October 14. 1998, Peterson tiled a Notice Of Appeal with the trial court. (R. 
1620-21). 
7. On December 15, 1998. Chief Justice Howe signed an Order dismissing 
Peterson's appeal because the Order appealed from was ruled to be a nonfmai judgment. 
(R. 1640). 
8. On January 21,2000, the Supreme Court issued a Remittor to the trial court. (R. 
1641). 
9. On March 31, 2000, the Honorable James R. Taylor entered an Order adopting 
the findings and conclusions of fact and law in Judge Maetanfs June 15, 1998 
Memorandum Decision, granting Sunrider's and Chen's motions to dismiss and for 
summary judgment and denying Peterson's motion for partial summary judgment. (R. 
1668-69). 
10. On April 19, 2000, Peterson filed a Notice Of Appeal with the trial court. (R. 
1690-91). 
11. On April 26, 2002, the Utah Supreme Court entered its decision, which 
reversed the order dismissing Peterson's claims, affirmed the denial of Peterson's Motion 
for Summary Judgment, and remanded the matter to the trial court. (R. 1739-1748). 
12. On July 8, 2003. a scheduling conference was held before Judge Laycock; 
present were counsel for Peterson, Sunrider and Chen. (R. 1754). 
13. According to the Minutes of Scheduling Conference for July 8, 2003, "the 
amended complaint is to be filed by 8-12-2002. Counsel will then file a scheduling order 
and a pre-trial may be set at that time." (R. 1754). 
14. On August 29, 2003, Sunrider and Chen filed a Motion to Dismiss for Failure 
to Prosecute with accompanying Memorandum in Support of Motion to Dismiss for 
Failure to Prosecute. (R. 1755-1760). 
15. On November 26,2003, a Ruling on Defendants' Motion to Dismiss for Failure 
to Prosecute was filed, which granted the motion, and the Order of Dismissal With 
Prejudice was entered on January 7, 2004. (R. 1788-1795 and 1801-1802). 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The trial court erred in entering the January 7, 2004 Order of Dismissal with 
Prejudice. The trial court abused its discretion in dismissing with prejudice Peterson "s 
case where Sunrider and Chen had asserted a counterclaim and neither the Plaintiff nor the 
Defendants had failed to prosecute their claims within a one year period. 
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ARGUMENT 
L Did the trial court abuse its discretion by granting defendants1 
motion to dismiss for failure to prosecute when the defendants had 
asserted a counterclaim and where both parties had failed to prosecute 
their claims for approximately a one year period? 
Pursuant to Utah Rules of Civil Procedure 41(b), a defendant may move for 
dismissal of an action or of any claim against him for the plaintiffs failure to prosecute. 
In reviewing whether a motion to dismiss for failure to prosecute, the trial court has 
discretion whether to grant such amotion. Wilson v. Lambert 613 P.2d 765 (Utah 1980). 
The trial court must consider the following factors when determining whether to grant a 
motion to dismiss for failure to prosecute: (1) the conduct of both parties; (2) the 
opportunity each party has had to move the case forward: (3) what each of the parties has 
done to move the case forward: (4) what difficulty or prejudice may have been caused to 
the other side by the party's delay: and (5), most important, whether injustice may result 
from the dismissal. Maxrield v. Rushton, 779 P.2d 237 (Ut. Ct. App. 1989), cert, denied, 
789 P.2d 33 (Utah 1989) citing K.L.C. Inc. v. McLean. 656 P.2d 986 (Utah 1982) and 
Utah Oil Co. v Harris. 565 P.2d 1135 (Utah 1977). 
A review of the record indicates that both Sunrider and Chen have not undertaken 
any action to move this case to a resolution during die approximately one year Peterson 
failed to act—no correspondence with Pedersen's counsel inquiring about the status of the 
Amended Complaint, no further discover}7, no inquiry about a pre-trial conference, and no 
foilow-up on a Motion to Compel which was granted, which required Pedersen to provide 
additional answers to Sunrider's and Chen's Interrogatories. Furthermore, both Sunrider 
and Chen did nothing to prosecute their counterclaim, the declarator}'judgment regarding 
any contractual relationships between the parties. The Utah Supreme Court has held that 
it was an abuse of discretion for the trial court to dismiss an action for failure to prosecute 
where either party could have obtained relief to bring the case to a conclusion, but neither 
did so for almost four years. Johnson v. Firebrand, Inc., 571 P.2d 1368 (Utah 1977). The 
Johnson court reasoned that "since any party to this action could have obtained the relief 
to which was entitled...but both parties chose to dally for a number of years, it was an 
abuse of discretion to grant respondent's motion to dismiss." Johnson, 571 P.2d at 1369 
quoting Crystal Lime & Cement Co.v. Robbins, 8 Utah 2d 389, 393. 335 P.2d 624, 626 
(1959). In Crystal Lime, the case lay idle for approximately eight years when the 
defendant sought a motion to dismiss for failure to prosecute; however, the Crystal Lime 
court reasoned that because the defendant had filed a counterclaim, it had become "cross-
complainants in the action" and could not seek to dismiss the opposing party's claim when 
he himself had dallied "for a number of years." Crystal Lime, 8 Utah 2d at 393, 335 P.2d 
at 626. Like the defendant in Crystal Lime, both Sunrider and Chen have filed a 
Counterclaim, seeking declaratory relief from this Court and have become "cross-
complainants" in this matter. And also like the defendant in Crvstal Lime, Sunrider and 
Chen cannot seek to dismiss Peterson's claim because of a failure to prosecute when they 
themselves have not prosecuted their own claims within the same period of time. 
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Another factor which the trial court must weigh is what difficulty or prejudice may 
have been caused to the other side by the delay. Westinghouse Elec. Supply Co. v. Paul 
W. Larsen Contractor. Inc.. 544 P.2d 876 (Utah 1975). Both Sunrider and Chen have not 
suffered any prejudice as a result of a nearly one year delay in this matter. In fact, nowhere 
in the Defendants' Memorandum in Support of the Motion to Dismiss does either Sunrider 
or Chen allege that they have been prejudiced by the one year delay. (R. 1755-1760). 
The most important Maxfield factor is whether injustice may result from the 
dismissal of the action. Maxfield, 779 P.2d at 239. This matter has been ongoing for 
several years—through two appeals and countless motions and discovery—and will soon 
be ready for trial since most of the discovery has already occurred. It would serve as a 
great injustice to Peterson, who has undertaken extensive prosecution of this matter from 
depositions to an appeal before the Utah Supreme Court, if her claims are summarily 
dismissed because both her and the opposing parties failed to act during the past year. 
It is further important to note that in other cases whether one party sought dismissal 
of the case for failure to prosecute, the actual time period which the matter had sat idle was 
a greater time than merely the one year in the present action. The Utah Supreme Court has 
found that it was not an abuse of discretion to grant a motion to dismiss for failure to 
prosecute where five and a half years had elapsed before prosecuting the claim. Brasher 
Motor & Fin. Co. v. Brown. 23 Utah 2d 247. 461 P.2d 464 (1969). See also Grundman 
v. Williams & Peterson, 685 P.2d 538 (Utah 1984) (a period of four years of case 
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idleness), Johnson v. Firebrand, Inc., 571 P.2d 1368 (Utah 1977) (where neither party 
brought the case to a conclusion for nearly four years), Countrv Meadows Convalescent 
Ctr.v. Utah Dept. of Health, 851 P.2d 1212 (Ut. Ct. App. 1993) (inactivity for over five 
years), and Crystal Lime & Cement Co.v. Robbins. 8 Utah 2d 389, 335 P.2d 624 (1959) 
(inactivity by both parties over an eight year period). The period where this matter has sat 
idle is only approximately one year and has not been a sufficient time whereby the trial 
court could have found that Peterson has failed to prosecute her claims. 
CONCLUSION 
Based upon the foregoing reasons and analysis, Peterson respectfully requests that 
this Court reverse the trial court's January 7. 2004 Order of Dismissal with Prejudice. 
<A DATED this W day of July, 2004. 
ROBINSON, SEILER & GLAZIER. LC 
Thomii W. Seiler 
Ryan T. Peel 
Attorneys for Plaintiff/Appellant 
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Case No. 960400174 
Judge Claudia Laycock 
Division 5 
This matter comes before the Court on a Motion to Dismiss for Failure to Prosecute, filed 
by the defendants, Sunrider Corp., dba Sunrider International, and Tei Fu Chen ("defendants"), 
which was fully briefed and submitted to the Court on October 1, 2003. Defendants requested a 
hearing; however, pursuant to Rule 4-501(3)(C)(b), the Court deems a hearing unnecessary, as 
the "dispositive issue or set of issues governing the granting or denial of the motion has been 
authoritatively decided." Therefore, having read the memoranda and being duly informed, the 
Court now enters the following ruling. 
RELEVANT FACTS 
1. The original complaint in this matter was filed on March 19, 1996. 
2. After a pretrial conference on March 11, 1999, no action was taken by plaintiff for a 
period often months. 
3. Defendants brought a motion to dismiss for failure to prosecute on February 2, 2000. 
4. Defendant's motion to dismiss was submitted to the Court on February 22, 2000, 
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without a response from plaintiff. Plaintiff filed an untimely response on February 24, 2000. 
5. After defendants filed the motion to dismiss, plaintiff began the series of actions to 
secure a final order and start the appellate process. 
6. On March 30, 2000, Judge James R. Taylor signed an order which clarified previous 
orders and provided a "final order," so that plaintiff could begin her appeal. 
7. On April 30, 2000 plaintiff filed her notice of appeal. 
8. On April 26, 2002 the Supreme Court of Utah issued an opinion which reversed the 
summary judgment order dismissing plaintiffs claim, affirmed the denial of plaintiff s own 
motion for partial summary judgment, and remanded the case back to the district court level. 
9. On May 14, 2002 this case was remitted back to the district court for proceedings 
consistent with the previously issued opinion. 
10. On June 10, 2002 counsel for defendants filed a document entitled Request for 
Scheduling Conference, asking to establish dates for the completion of discovery and other pre-
trial activities. 
11. During a scheduling conference held on July 8, 2002, this Court ruled that Janet 
Peterson ("plaintiff) could file an amended complaint and established August 12, 2002 as a 
deadline for such filing. The Court also ordered the parties' attorneys to then file a scheduling 
order, after which a pretrial conference could be set. 
12. The amended complaint has never been filed, nor have the parties' attorneys ever 
filed a scheduling order or requested a pretrial conference. In fact, no further documents were 
filed by either party until August 29, 2003. 
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13. On August 29, 2003, counsel for defendants filed their Motion to Dismiss for Failure 
to Prosecute, asking the Court to dismiss this action according to Rule 41(b) of the Utah Rules of 
Civil Procedure, because plaintiffs have done nothing to advance this case since the July 8, 2002 
hearing. 
14. On September 16, 2003 plaintiff filed a memorandum in opposition to the motion. 
15. On September 29, 2003 defendants filed a reply memorandum. 
16. On October 1, 2003 plaintiff filed a notice to submit. 
DISCUSSION 
Rule 41(b) states in relevant part, "For failure of the plaintiff to prosecute or to comply 
with these rules or any order of court, a defendant may move for dismissal of an action or of any 
claim against him . . . Unless the court in its order for dismissal otherwise specifies, a dismissal 
under this subdivision...operates as an adjudication upon the merits." Both parties acknowledge 
that a significant portion of the decision on a motion to dismiss is based upon the Court's 
discretion. See Wilson v. Lambert, 613 P.2d 765, 767 (Utah 1980). 
In addition to the "mere elapse of time," the court may consider the following factors 
when interpreting Rule 41(b) and motions to dismiss for failure to prosecute: "(1) 'The conduct 
of both parties'; (2) the opportunity available to each party to move the case forward; (3) what 
each party has accomplished in moving the case forward; (4) the difficulty or prejudice imposed 
on the opposing party by reason of the delay; and (5) "'most important, whether injustice may 
result from the dismissal/" Hartford Leasing Corp. v. State of Utah, 888 P.2d 694, 697-698 (Ut. 
3 
App. 1994). These are factors that the court may consider, but they are neither mandatory nor 
exhaustive. 
The case presently before the Court was filed in 1996 and has had a long and complicated 
history, including a ruling on summary judgment that was appealed to and reversed by the Utah 
Supreme Court. Although the case was remitted to the district court level on May 14, 2002, the 
record demonstrates that plaintiff has made no attempt to move this case along since that date. 
Defendants have filed the only two motions found in the file since May 2002: (1) a motion for a 
scheduling conference and (2) this motion for dismissal for failure to prosecute. Both parties 
appeared at the July 8, 2003 hearing before the Court, at which time the Court granted plaintiffs 
request to file her amended complaint adding a new party. Plaintiff subsequently failed to 
comply with the Court's deadline, and, to this date, has still not submitted an amended 
complaint. 
Plaintiff argues that defendants should not prevail on this motion because the "defendants 
have done nothing in the past year to move this case forward." Specifically, plaintiff faults 
defendants for (1) their failure to inquire through correspondence as to the status of the amended 
complaint, (2) their failure to undertake any further discovery, (3) their failure to inquire about 
the required attorneys' planning meeting, and (4) their failure to follow up on their earlier 
successful motion to compel (requiring plaintiff to provide additional answers to 
4 
interrogatories).1 Surprisingly, plaintiff offers no excuse or justification for her failure to file her 
amended complaint or for her failure to set up the Rule 26 meeting and to request a pretrial 
conference. 
Based upon the particular circumstances of this case, the Court finds that it was not 
defendants' responsibility to move this case forward. Placing that burden upon defendants would 
have put them in the absurd position of begging plaintiff to file her amended complaint so that 
defendants could respond to it and proceed with discovery. Clearly, defendants had no motive to 
incur the additional cost of further discovery or trial, when plaintiff was supposed to file an 
amended complaint, but did not. As stated in Hartford: 
We pause to note the obvious: What each party has done to move the case 
forward can only be evaluated in light of each party's responsibility concerning 
the case. Of course, the plaintiff, as the party initiating the lawsuit, has the 
primary responsibility to move the case forward. The defendant's responsibility is 
limited to responding timely to the action, expeditiously attending to discovery, 
and moving any counterclaim along. The defendant has no general responsibility 
to move plaintiffs action to judgment. 
Id. at 698. 
This Court finds that defendants have fulfilled their responsibility in this matter, as they 
have had no "general responsibility" since July 8, 2003 to "move plaintiffs action to judgment." 
Id. In the history of this case, plaintiff has twice allowed this case to stagnate; however, this 
Plaintiffs counsel has submitted no support for this position through affidavit or any 
other evidentiary source. The Court can determine from the file that no discovery documents 
have been filed by either party subsequent to the July 8, 2003 hearing (other than the present 
motion, etc.), but the Court has absolutely no admissible evidence before it that there has been no 
correspondence between the parties or inquiry about the attorneys' planning meeting. 
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second occasion is of greater concern, as it was clearly plaintiffs responsibility to move this 
forward after her successful appeal. More than a year elapsed before defendants filed their 
motion to dismiss; plaintiff accomplished absolutely nothing during that year-plus time period. 
The Court is not persuaded by plaintiffs arguments that, since this case was filed in 1996, 
a one-year delay does not prejudice the defendants. The opposite argument is much more 
persuasive; where the case was already 6 years old when the appellate decision was rendered, 
time was clearly of the essence, and plaintiff should have kept this matter moving. 
Plaintiff also argues that the matter "will soon be ready for trial," dismissing the case 
"would serve as a great injustice" to the plaintiff, and one year of inactivity does not justify 
dismissal. The case law indicates that the simple matter of time is highly fact-sensitive and is not 
determinative. In this case, which is now almost 8 years old, the Court has nothing before it 
which would persuade it that the case will soon be ready for trial, especially when the last 
hearing before this Court resulted in permission for plaintiff to file an amended complaint, which 
would add a party. The Court is also persuaded that the plaintiffs inattention to this case during 
2 distinct time periods demonstrates that plaintiff fears no great prejudice due to dismissal of this 
matter; otherwise, she would have kept this matter moving forward. 
Any injustice that results from this dismissal is outweighed by plaintiffs own lack of 
interest in the case and the injustice to defendant of carrying the burden of a law suit forward on 
behalf of plaintiff. 
CONCLUSION 
Defendant's Motion to Dismiss for Failure to Prosecute is granted. Counsel for 
6 
defendant is to prepare findings of fact, conclusions of law and an order consistent with this 
ruling. 
<fi^ 
DATED this 9ip day of November, 2003. 
Case No. 960400174 
, . \f ?JV # . 
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IN THE FOURTH DISTRICT COURT FOR UTAH COUNTY 
PROVO DEPARTMENT 
STATE OF UTAH 
JANET PETERSON, : 
ORDER OF DISMISSAL 
Plaintiff, : WITH PREJUDICE 
vs. : 
SUNRIDER CORP., dba SUNRIDER : Case No. 960400174 
INTERNATIONAL, and TEI FU Judge: Claudia Laycock 
CHEN, : 
Defendants. : 
The above-entitled matter came on regularly on Defendant's motion to dismiss 
for failure to prosecute. The court having entered its ruling, and findings of fact and 
conclusions of law in favor of Defendant, the Court hereby ORDERS, ADJUDGES AND 
DECREES that the above-entitled case be and hereby is dismissed with prejudice 
based upon Plaintiffs failure to prosecute. 
Thomas H. Seiler 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
RUL£ 4-504 NOTICE 
Pursuant to Rule 4-504 of the Code of Judicial Administration, the undersigned 
will submit the foregoing Order to Judge Claudia Laycock of the Fourth Judicial District 
Court of Utah County, for signature upon the expiration of eight days from 
j Q £ ^ a £ 2 ^ ? 2 0 0 3 , unless written objection is filed prior to that time. 
STEVENSON & SMITH, P.C. 
'3rad C. Smith 
Attorney for Defendants 
MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I hereby certify that I mailed a copy of the foregoing Order by U.S. Mail, postage 
prepaid, this fU day of Mdfr&fa^ 2003, to the following: 
Thomas H. Seiler 
ROBINSON, SEILER & GLAZIER 
80 North 1000 East 
P.O. Box 1266 
Provo, UT 84603-1266 
^ 2 _ * a ^ , H=r 
Peterson v. Sunrider, et al. 
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of 
